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Abstract: The presence of “holdouts” in recent sovereign debt swaps poses a 
challenge to bargaining models which assume all creditors to be homogeneous. 
We modify the Rubinstein “alternating offers” framework so as to accommodate 
exogenous creditor heterogeneity – specifically holdouts more patient than other 
bondholders. The “second best” equilibrium derived is an initial offer and an 
associated “lock-law” sufficient to tempt impatient creditors into a prompt bond 
exchange. This is followed by a delayed, but more generous, swap with the patient 
creditors, timed to take place when the lock-law expires. In practice, however, 
the presence of holdouts may be endogenous: they may be late-comers who buy 
distressed bonds with a view to litigating for the full face value plus their costs of 
waiting. Provisions for protecting other bond holders from the negative external-
ity caused by such tactics are briefly discussed. However, where the judge has 
mandated good faith bargaining with holdout creditors, the bargaining outcome 
we derive may be useful to indicate a basis for compromise.
Keywords: bargaining; delay; holdouts; lock law; second-best; sovereign debt 
restructuring.
JEL Classifications: C70; C78; F34; K00.
1  Introduction
In the current paradigm, sovereign debt restructuring – by debt swaps or  otherwise 
– is treated as an integral part of the risk-sharing involved in sovereign lending, 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chapter 6).1 For domestic “junk” bonds, the risk-
spread over Treasuries is expected to cover the potential effects of  restructuring 
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1 The “insurance” that is extended to the debtor in this way will, however, be limited for familiar 
reasons – moral hazard and adverse selection.
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or  liquidation under a bankruptcy code administered by a judge. So, by analogy, 
the sovereign debt write-downs involved in a crisis should, in principle, be bal-
anced by risk-premia paid in non-crisis states of the world.
The writing-down of sovereign debt obligations is much more problematic, 
however, as they have to be restructured by negotiation between the sovereign 
and its creditors.2 In their classic paper on “debt-recontracting,” Bulow and 
Rogoff (1989) proposed an elegant solution: that the Rubinstein alternating-offers 
model be used to characterize these negotiations and to predict their outcome. 
In this framework, the settlement essentially depends on the relative impatience 
of debtor and creditor (i.e. how their subjective rates of discount compare); and, 
with complete information, it is achieved without delay.
The presence of “holdouts” in recent debt swaps, i.e. creditors who do not 
accept a swap which has been taken up by other “exchange” bond holders, 
implies, however, that creditors are heterogeneous. Can the alternating-offers 
bargaining approach still be used? We show that it can be adapted appropriately 
where such heterogeneity is exogenous – when, for example, the population of 
creditors, independently of the crisis, happens to be divided between some who 
are patient and others who are impatient. Specifically, we show that, where the 
type of individual creditors is not known to the debtor, there is a role for more 
than one debt swap, each tailored to attract a different type, with “lock laws” put 
in place to ensure that the swaps get taken up by the creditors for whom they are 
intended.
These lock laws correspond to the rights upon future offers (RUFO) clauses 
used in practice, which (as the name implies) ensure that creditors who have 
agreed to an earlier swap can, for a determined period, participate in later swaps 
if they so desire.3 In the two-creditor case of Section 2, the outcome derived is an 
initial offer which, together with the RUFO clause, is sufficient to tempt impatient 
creditors (the exchange bondholders) into a prompt bond swap. This is followed 
by a delayed – but more generous – swap with the patient creditors (the hold-
outs), timed to take place when the lock law expires. The waiting-time involved 
before the second swap represents a loss in bargaining efficiency; but the delay 
functions as a costly signal to identify the more patient creditors.
2 For a comparison of recovery rates on distressed debt as between corporate and sovereigns see 
Singh (2003); in addition Trebesch et al. (2012) provide a comprehensive survey of sovereign debt 
restructurings up to 2010.
3 For example, in the initial debt swap of 2005, where only about 70% of the bonds were 
exchanged, the Argentina sovereign added a RUFO clause (ratified in Parliament) to assure those 
in the bond exchange that they would have access any improved offers made over the following 
decade. Further details on the Argentine case are to be found in Appendix 2.
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The theoretical question we address is whether such clauses can lead to 
second-best or “constrained efficient” outcomes in the presence of creditor het-
erogeneity.4 We find that there are, in fact, multiple equilibria; but a second-best 
“benchmark” can be derived. A simple calibration of such a benchmark settle-
ment is provided to illustrate how both the shares of creditors and debtor and 
the duration of the RUFO clause change as the degree of creditor heterogeneity 
increases – specifically as the holdouts become more patient. (The welfare losses 
if the debtor and the holdout are unable to coordinate on the second-best bench-
mark also increase with the patience of the holdout.)
An important caveat is considered in Section 3, namely that the presence of 
holdouts may be induced by the crisis: they may be late-comers who buy dis-
tressed bonds with a view to litigating for recovery of the full face value. Such 
endogenous holdouts may include so-called “vulture funds” who aim to recover 
all their waiting costs, including those of delay and of litigation; and their activi-
ties can seriously disrupt the process of debt restructuring. We discuss ex ante 
provisions for protecting other bond-holders from the negative externality caused 
by vultures. These include adding aggregation clauses to the collective action 
clauses (CACs) now included in sovereign debt contracts; finding substitutes for 
US-law bonds; regional regulation of secondary debt markets; creating some form 
of SDRM; and promoting “soft law.”
In conclusion, however, we argue that the second-best bargaining scenario 
we outline may be useful as a basis for finding a compromise with holdouts 
ex post. The recovery rate so derived will, of course, fall far short of the punishing 
claims typically pursued by “vulture funds.” But it may be useful for an adjudica-
tor charged with finding a “just accord.”
2   Negotiating a Write-Down with Heterogeneous 
Creditors
2.1  Exogenous Creditor Heterogeneity
To characterize debt renegotiation, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) adopt the “alter-
nating offers” approach of Ariel Rubinstein, where two parties bargaining over 
 fractions of a pie in principle take it in turns to propose how it be shared; and it is 
4 The first best would require – contrary to what we assume – that the debtor knows the type of 
each creditor. 
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the relative impatience of debtor and creditor to achieve a settlement that deter-
mines the outcome. (Broadly speaking, the pie could be thought of as the face 
value of the debt to be restructured, with the fraction retained by the sovereign 
debtor indicating the “write-down” involved in restructuring.)5
In the light of “holdouts” who decline to enter the initial swap, some modifi-
cation of this bilateral approach is called for. Here we show how the alternating 
offers approach may be extended to accommodate creditor heterogeneity.
2.1.1  Alternating Offers – with Swaps at Two Dates
For simplicity, consider the case of a sovereign debtor negotiating with two credi-
tors. The debtor, denoted by D, has a discount rate δD > 0 and associated discount 
factor ,D te δ− ∆  where Δt (which can be assumed to be negligibly small) is the 
minimal time interval between two successive rounds of bargaining.6
The creditors, denoted by X for the Exchange bond holder, and by H for the 
Holdout, are distinguished by their discount rates 0 < δH < δX (with associated dis-
count factors δ δ− −∆ ∆>H Xt te e  We assume that each creditor knows its own discount 
rate; and the sovereign debtor is also aware of the different discount rates, but 
does not know who is which.
At each t, the debtor and the two creditors must decide whether or not to 
settle. If the debtor and one of the two creditors7 agree to settle, then bargaining 
proceeds according to Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game; once an 
agreement has been reached, the creditor exits the process with a payment equal 
to the settlement offer.
A lock law (the RUFO clause) effectively bans any improved offer to the other 
creditor for T periods (to be derived as part of the equilibrium calculations). At T, 
the remaining creditor and the debtor must choose whether or not to settle. Once 
they do so, bargaining proceeds according to Rubinstein alternating offers bar-
gaining game; once an agreement has been reached, the creditor exits the process 
with a payment equal to the settlement offer.
5 This is the bilateral approach applied by the current authors to analyze the Argentine debt 
swap of 2005 (in Dhillon et al. 2006).
6 All our results are stated for the case when Δt is negligibly small at the continuous time limit 
as Δt→0.
7 If both creditors agree to settle, one of the two is chosen, with equal probability, to bargain 
with the debtor.
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We focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria8 where strategies and beliefs are con-
figured so that:
(i) the debtor and the exchange bond holder choose to settle immediately and 
agree to a split;
(ii) after the specified period of waiting time T implied by the RUFO clause 
elapses, the debtor and the holdout creditor choose to settle immediately and 
agree to a split;
(iii) the beliefs are such that debtor believes with probability one that (a) the 
creditor who chooses to settle at t = 0 is the exchange bond holder and (b) the 
creditor who chooses to settle at t = T is holdout. (Note that the equilibrium 
concept requires consistency between beliefs and actions so that we need to 
check that appropriate incentive constraints are satisfied for both creditor 
types.)
For convenience the bargaining surplus (the potential gains from restoring the 
debtor’s access to capital markets) is taken to be constant and normalized to one.
A welcome simplification is that it is possible to solve for the shares of the 
two creditor types separately from the deriving the waiting time implied by the 
incentive constraints. To derive the shares, note that after the period T > 0 waiting 
time, there is only one creditor present so, given the initial offer sX which has been 
accepted by the exchange bondholder, the bargaining surplus remaining is 1–sX.
Consider the complete information bargaining game between the debtor and 
the holdout at time T: at the continuous time limit, there will be immediate agree-
ment where the share of the Holdout is
( 1 )DH X
D H
s sδ
δ δ
= −
+
Likewise, at t = 0, in anticipation that sH will be committed to the Holdout 
creditor, the offer made by the debtor to the Exchange bondholder (and immedi-
ately agreed to) is
( 1 ).DX H
D X
s sδ
δ δ
= −
+
8 In Appendix 1 (below) we show that there is delay occurs in all the perfet Bayesian  equilibira 
of the game and the minimum delay compatible with a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium is 
the second-best benchmark derived below. In a companion paper, “Debt Restructuring with 
 Heterogeneous Creditors: Delay and Endogenous Entry,” we consider the general case of T credi-
tor types and show all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the debt restructuring game involve delay 
and focus on a formal analysis of endogenous entry. 
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So the shares may be derived as depending simply on the discount rates:
,
( )
.
( )
D H
X
D X H X H
D X
H
D X H X H
s
s
δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
=
+ +
=
+ +
In order to calculate the waiting time, we need to consider the relevant incen-
tive compatibility conditions, namely:
ˆ ˆ;    X HT TH X H Xs e s s e s
δ δ− −≤ ≥
where sX and sH, δX and δH are defined as above and Tˆ  is the waiting time (delay) 
incorporated in the (constrained) efficient RUFO clause.
The first inequality implies that the offer to the Holdout, discounted back at 
the discount rate of Exchange holder, leaves the latter content with early settle-
ment, with no incentive to join the Holdout. The second inequality implies that 
the Holdout creditor has no incentive to deviate and join the Exchange bond-
holder to settle early.
The key feature of the two-stage procedure is that the Holdout has to wait, 
being induced to do so by an offer which will be better than that accepted by the 
impatient Exchange bondholder who settles early, i.e. sH > sX.
Why should the Exchange bond holder accept an initial offer from the debtor, 
when the latter is free to settle later with the Holdout? Why not delay acceptance 
to get a higher offer? This is where the mechanism of the RUFO clause9 plays an 
important role. Such a clause, a “lock-law” which prevents the debtor from giving 
a more attractive offer exclusively to the holdouts for a fixed period, reassures the 
creditor who settles early; and effectively allows the more patient creditor to give 
a costly signal of his/her type.
Ideally, the expiry of the clause defines the shortest period of waiting accept-
able to the more patient creditor, but not the impatient type. It is implicitly 
assumed that the swap will remain open for those who have not settled – either 
(in line with RUFO) to accept the terms first agreed or to negotiate better terms 
when the RUFO expires.
Evidently there are multiple equilibria, in that the incentive compatibility 
conditions define a range but not a unique period of delay. What is this range? 
Let 0T>  be the solution to   ;HTH Xs e s
δ−
=  and let Tˆ  be the solution to the equation 
9 The RUFO clause is a form of most favored creditor clause indicating that, over a specified 
horizon, any improved offer made to the holdouts must be made available to the exchange bond-
holders as well.
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  .   XTH Xs e s
δ−
=  Then, in equilibrium, waiting time ∈ ˆ[ , ]T T T  where (i) Tˆ  is the 
 earliest point in time at which a second-offer will be made to the holdout and 
(ii)  T  is the maximum time the holdout is willing to wait for an offer by the 
debtor. Taking the earliest waiting time as the second-best benchmark, one can 
treat greater delay, (where agreement is reached at some > ≤ ˆ, T T T T ), as a form 
of coordination failure between the debtor and the holdout.10
We may depict all the equilibria in Figure 1 where the ratio H
X
s
s  is measured 
on the y-axis and time on the x-axis; and the discount factors of the two creditors 
show how much more patient is the holdout.
Note first that the discount factors immediately imply the relative shares 
shown by the horizontal line where ,H X
X H
s
s
δ
δ
=  i.e. the lower the discount rate of 
the holdout the higher its share.
Note second that ˆ,T  the constrained-efficient RUFO clause, is the point at 
which the Exchange bond-holder’s incentive constraint is satisfied as an equal-
ity; while T  is the point at which the Holdout creditor’s incentive constraint is 
satisfied as an equality. So, in equilibrium, delay can be for any length of time 
ˆ[ , ].T T T∈ 
Clearly creditor heterogeneity is crucial for obtaining equilibrium delay in 
our model: if both creditors are identical, there will be no delay in the continuous 
time limit. This can be seen in the above diagram; if δH = δX so 1H
X
s
s
=  then the two 
T
1
sX /sH
δH
e–δXT e
–δHT
T ≤ T ≤ T~
δX
Figure 1: Creditor shares and the waiting time.
10 There are other perfect Bayesian equilibria which involve coordination failure between the 
debtor and both the exchange bondholder and the holdout creditor. These are described in 
 Appendix 1.
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exponential curves coincide and intersect the line depicting H
X
s
s
 at 1, so there is 
no delay.
Observe that as δH becomes smaller (so that the holdout creditor is more 
patient), the curve depicting HTe δ−  swivels anti-clockwise from 1 on the y-axis; 
and the line showing the relative shares moves down. Therefore, T  is increasing 
in δH: i.e. the more patient is the Holdout creditor, the longer is the delay associ-
ated with any equilibrium of the debt restructuring game.
Although the model is stated for the case with two creditors, this analysis can 
be extended to cover the case where there are many creditors but only two types 
(distinguished by different discount factors and/or waiting costs). However, the 
debtor, who does not know which creditor is of which type, is assumed to know 
the overall distribution of creditors over the two types.11 The simple model studied 
here, then, corresponds to the case where the proportion of creditors of each type 
is one half each and the debtor bargains with a representative creditor from each 
type.12
2.2  Calibration
Next, we provide a simple calibration to quantify some of the comparative statics 
described above. Given that the real interest rate of much developing country sov-
ereign debt is 5%, we set the discount rate of the debtor at 0.05 and we take this 
to characterize the Exchange bondholder too, i.e. δD = 0.05 = δX.
As a benchmark, let the Holdout be equally impatient, so δH = 0.05 = δX. In this 
case, at any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, agreement occurs at t = 0 and 1
3X H
s s= =  
where sD = 0.5 denotes the debtor’s share.
We vary the discount rate of the Holdout creditor and, in the Table 1 below, 
report the second-best delay ˆ,T  the maximum delay ,T  the share of the Exchange 
bondholder SX, the share of the Holdout SH as well as the share of the debtor SD.
These results are illustrated in Figure 2 with the debtor’s share measured on 
the vertical axis, Exchange bondholder’s to the right and that of the Holdout to 
the left.
The points all lie on a simplex whose corners indicate outcomes most favora-
ble to each of the participants in turn. The outcome with no creditor heterogene-
ity is shown in the middle of the simplex with the label 0 to indicate zero delay. 
11 For the purpose of discussion, we leave on one side the role of third parties, like the IMF. 
12 The assumed proportion of creditors of each type need not be a half. It can be shown that 
reducing the proportion of holdouts will reduce their shares; but not the delay. 
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The effect of increased patience on the part of the Holdout is shown by the arrow 
heading towards the lower left corner, with the second-best delay times in years 
indicated by the numbers 0, 10, …, ∞. Evidently, the Holdout gains at the expense 
of both the Exchange bondholder and Debtor as heterogeneity is increased; and, 
in the limit, the Holdout takes all.
Numerically, we see from the Table 1 that as δH drops below 0.05 to 0.045, 
for example, the shares of the Exchange bondholder and debtor both fall to 0.32; 
the Holdout gets 36% of the bargaining surplus and agreement with the Debtor 
occurs after a delay of 2 years in the “second-best” setting. The “maximum” equi-
librium delay resulting from coordination failure between the debtor and the 
Holdout creditor over agreeing when to settle in this case, as shown in the Table 1, 
is 2.5 years; as the gap between the two is not too large, the failure to coordinate 
on the second best will result in small welfare losses.
Table 1: Calibration of the benchmark waiting time and creditor shares.
  Tˆ   T   SH  SX  SD
δH = 0.05   0 year   0 year   0.33  0.33  0.33
δH = 0.045   2 years   2.5 years   0.36  0.32  0.32
δH = 0.04   4.5 years  5.5 years   0.38  0.31  0.31
δH = 0.035   7 years   10 years   0.42  0.29  0.29
δH = 0.03   10 years   17 years   0.45  0.275  0.275
δH = 0.025   14 years   28 years   0.5  0.25  0.25
δH = 0.015   24 years   80 years   0.625  0.1875  0.1875
δH = 0.005   46 years   460 years  0.8333  0.08333  0.08333
SX
SH
SD
1
0
10
∞1
1
Figure 2: Debtor and creditor shares for increasingly patient holdout.
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But as the Holdout creditor becomes more patient relative to the Exchange 
bondholder and the debtor, their shares drop monotonically and agreement 
between the debtor and the Holdout creditor occurs after a longer period of second-
best delay. As the gap between the latter and the maximum delay also increases, 
moreover, failure to coordinate on second-best could lead to larger welfare losses.
To generate a second-best delay of 10 years (which corresponds to the lock 
law passed by the Argentine parliament in 2005 when the first batch of exchange 
holders settled), we would need to assume δH = 0.03. As δH drops towards zero, 
the second-best delay increases exponentially (as does the gap between it and 
maximum equilibrium delay) and the share of the Exchange bondholder and the 
Debtor falls towards zero with share of the Holdout increasing towards one.
Two key insights emerge from the calibration exercise. First, the Holdout 
creditor gains at the expense of both other participants.13 Second, the more patient 
the Holdout, the greater are the signaling costs of handling creditor heterogeneity, 
i.e. the delay before the second swap. (The gap between the second best and the 
maximum delay also increases, indicating greater welfare losses from failing to 
coordinate on the second-best benchmark.)
3  An Important Caveat
3.1  When Heterogeneity is Endogenous
So far the heterogeneous composition of the creditor group has been taken as 
exogenous: there just happen to be these differences in discount rates between 
holdouts and the rest. Taking these differences as predetermined, we have looked 
for the constrained-efficient outcome.
But what if the participation of the holdouts is endogenous? In the context 
of the simple model outlined above, suppose, to begin with, that there are two 
Exchange bondholders. A straightforward implication of the bargaining model 
presented above is that there will be immediate settlement and both Exchange 
bondholders will obtain sX. Now, suppose a more patient fund manager 
approaches one of the Exchange bondholders (the debtor does not know which 
one) and offers sX+ε (where ε > 0 can be negligibly small) before bargaining begins. 
Then, the Exchange bondholder will sell its claim to the fund manager who now 
13 This finding seems consistent with Judge Griesa seeing the value of holdouts for the mainte-
nance of creditor rights in general, as discussed in Miller and Thomas (2007); but it offers small 
comfort to the Exchange bondholder, who loses out. 
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takes its place in the bargaining game as a Holdout creditor. As the calibration 
exercise shows, with the presence of the Holdout, there is constrained-efficient 
delay Tˆ  and a fall in the shares of both the other parties.
In bargaining where patience is power, endogenous entry of patient credi-
tors generates negative externalities. So, in the bargaining situation we describe, 
there may be a good case for dissuading late entry by those seeking to profit from 
what is a zero-sum game by causing delay.
Note, however, that those late entrants commonly referred to as “vulture 
funds” appear to operate with a different business model. According to Martin 
Kanenguiser (2014, chap. 7: p. 130), in a recent account mainly critical of the 
Argentine government:
The vulture funds, like many other investor funds, bought Argentine bonds a little before and a 
little after the default at a very low price. But, unlike the other investors who buy these bonds 
cheap to make some profit when the country does better, the mission of the vultures is to liti-
gate so as to recover 100% of the value of the debt. For this reason they focus on maintaining 
a team of expert lawyers rather than economists and prefer to wait and collect rather than on 
negotiating a write-down.
How appropriate this description may be can be checked by examining the past 
activities of these funds. The account given in chapter 7 of Kanenguiser’s book (of 
a “business model” of buy and collect by determined litigation) is plausible for 
least for two of the principal funds involved. That patient holdouts will indeed 
wait for full recovery (plus legal fees and accrued interest) is also documented in 
Trebesch et al. (2012) and Singh (2003).14
If the motivation and methods of these funds is as described – to buy bonds 
in order to collect full repayment at whatever cost in terms of delaying the restruc-
turing and to pursue this objective with exigent and expensive litigation – this 
implies far greater negative externalities; and a strong case for dissuading them 
from buying distressed bonds in the first place. The principal device to limit the 
negative externalities a vulture fund may impose is to enable the other creditors 
to outvote them on proposed restructuring – and to eliminate the gain they would 
otherwise make from delay. This and other measures are discussed below.
3.2  Changing the Rules to Block So-called “Vulture Funds”
The principal response by the key institutions directly involved has been to 
enhance the operation of the CACs now commonly included in sovereign debt 
14 Litigation continues to be high and increasing, though the “principal funds” referred to above 
do change names over time [see the annex of Singh (2003) on recovery values].
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contracts. To block the strategy of vulture funds who (to avoid being “crammed 
down” by others) acquire super-majority holdings of individual series of bond 
issues, “aggregation” clauses have been proposed which allow a super majority 
of all bond holders to over-rule intransigent holdouts in accepting a restructur-
ing. A boiler-plate for CACs modified in this respect has been prepared by ICMA, 
endorsed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), see IMF (2014), and has 
already been included in new bond issues by significant sovereign borrowers 
such as Mexico.
Another response might be the use of substitutes for US-law bonds now subject 
to the precedent of Judge Griesa’s recent pari passu ruling. These could be dollar 
bonds issued in other familiar jurisdictions, such as London or Paris. Should the 
UK or France be reluctant to challenge the US ruling in this way, however, new 
entrants like Shanghai may be ready to do so (as J. Stiglitz has suggested). It might 
also involve the issue of dollar bonds under local law (as proposed by S. Soler).
Various further initiatives may be considered. The first of these is institutional 
change at a regional level – e.g. European Treaty changes which could “immu-
nize within the confines of the Eurozone the assets of a Eurozone country receiv-
ing ESM bailout assistance from attachment by litigious holdout creditors,” as 
proposed by Buchheit et al. (2013) and discussed in Miller and Thomas (2013). 
The second is to revive the idea of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism at a 
global level, an initiative being explored by the UN. Finally there is the develop-
ment of “soft law” where anti-social practices are branded as such, with atten-
dant reputational costs – and possible reverse discrimination.
4  Conclusion
In the Rubinstein model of bargaining, only relative patience matters in dividing 
up the bargaining surplus between the debtor and its creditors: yet settlement is 
reached without delay. With heterogeneous creditors and asymmetric informa-
tion, however, we find that delay is necessary for the more patient creditors to 
signal their claim to a greater share: and we indicate how the extra share and the 
length of delay may be assessed at the time of the first swap.
We conclude, however, by indicating how the bargaining scenario we have 
outlined might also be useful as a basis for finding an ex post compromise with 
holdouts. Two principles would guide such a compromise. First that holdouts 
be given compensation for the extra delay they have experienced, with the com-
pensation calculated at their own subjective rate of discount (i.e. their cost of 
waiting). Second that this compensation be added to the settlement made with 
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the exchange bond holders at the time of the first swap, with appropriate  up-rating 
to cover the fall in the value of the dollar since then.
Were such principles were to be applied in the case of Argentina, currently 
in dispute, the resulting settlement would surely be a great deal more than the 
sovereign debtor has said it is willing to pay; but a good deal less than what the 
vulture funds have been claiming. This is because it replicates the outcome of bar-
gaining procedures designed to reward patience but not aggressive legal tactics. 
This may be useful for an adjudicator charged with finding a “just accord.”15
In future research, we plan to extend the bargaining model studied here to 
the case where the bargaining surplus itself evolves over time; and to a more 
general distribution of creditor types.
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Appendix 1 Alternating Offers: Technical Detail
In Appendix 1, as well as showing that any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the 
debt restructuring game involves delay, we point out the existence of other perfect 
Bayesian equilibria, we provide additional technical detail to some of the com-
parative statics reported in the main text, with Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) as 
recommended background reference.
With creditor heterogeneity, any perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
must involve delay and the minimum delay compatible with a 
pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium is the one studied in the 
main text
We show that any perfect Bayesian equilibrium must involve delay. At any perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium with immediate agreement, both the exchange bond 
holder and the holdout creditor must choose to settle at t = 0 with probability one 
(although only one of the two is selected to bargain with the debtor) and in the 
15 This is what they want, according to Robert Shapiro (a spokesman for creditors still holding 
out): “For more than a decade we have been seeking what any other creditor seeks after sover-
eign default: the chance to negotiate a just accord.” Kanenguiser (2014: p. 150).
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alternating offers bargaining subgame must immediately agree to the offer made 
by the debtor. Let S denote the offer made to the exchange bondholder in the alter-
nating offers bargaining subgame with immediate agreement. As both creditor 
types must accept the offer immediately, the offer made must make the holdout 
creditor indifferent between accepting and rejecting and therefore, as Δt→0, it 
follows that max (
.
) 2
D H D
D H H H H D H
S s δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ δ δ
→ = =
+ + +
 Therefore, for every ε′ > 0, 
there exists ε1 > 0 such that when the gap between any two rounds of bargaining 
is Δt, 0 < Δt < ε1, S ≥ smax–ε′. Let s equal the offer made to the exchange bondholder 
by the debtor when the debtor believes with probability one that the creditor he 
faces is the exchange bondholder in the bargaining subgame. At the continuous 
time limit as Δt→0, by construction, sX (expression derived in the main text) is 
the minimum offer that the exchange bondholder is willing to accept so that s→sX 
as Δt→0 and for every ε″ > 0, there exists ε2 > 0 such that when 0 < Δt < ε2, s  ≤  sX+ε″. 
At a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with immediate agreement, the debtor must 
attach a probability 12  that the creditor who is chosen to bargain with him is 
the exchange bondholder. By construction, smax > sX so that there exists ε3 > 0, ε′ > 0, 
ε″ > 0 such that when 0 < Δt < ε3, S ≥ smax–ε′ > sX+ε″ ≥ s. But then there is a value of ε > 0 
such that the debtor can make an offer which is ε less than S: the offer made at 
t = 0, is accepted by the exchange bondholder and not the holdout (who would 
prefer to wait Δt and bargain with the debtor to obtain S). In this way, the debtor 
obtains a higher share of the bargaining surplus. Therefore, for ε3 > 0 such that 
when 0 < Δt < ε3, there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium with immediate agree-
ment: any perfect Bayesian equilibrium must separate the two types of creditors. 
It follows that, at the continuous time limit as Δt→0, the minimum delay compat-
ible with a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the second-best bench-
mark derived in the main body of the paper above.
Other Perfect Bayesian Equilibria with Longer Delay Due to 
Lack of Coordination between the Debtor and Creditor
At the second-best equilibrium, ˆT T=  (the constrained-efficient RUFO clause); but, 
as discussed in the text, there are other equilibria with longer delay which satisfy 
the second-best incentive compatibility constraints (although these can be ruled 
out on efficiency grounds). There are other PBE as well, however, as when neither 
the debtor nor either creditor chooses to settle before a T′ > 0 quantum of time has 
elapsed. Then, at T′ periods, the debtor settles with the Exchange bondholder; 
and, after a further ∈ ˆ[ , ]T T T  periods, settles with the Holdout creditor. By con-
struction such equilibria involve longer delay than the second-best RUFO clause.
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Comparative Statics in δH
As , 0HTT e δ−→∞ →  and HTe δ−  is decreasing and continuous in T, there exists 
0T>  such that whenever ,T T≤   HTH Xs e s
δ− ≥  with equality when .T T=   Further, 
as 0 < δH < δX, it follows that .X
T
H Xs e s
δ− <  Let Tˆ  be the solution to the equa-
tion .XTH Xs e s
δ−
=  Clearly, ˆ .T T<   Therefore, at an equilibrium, the waiting time 
ˆ[ , ].T T T∈   Moreover, for each ˆ[ , ],T T T∈   given the strategies of the two creditors, 
the debtor cannot gain by deviating: any deviation on part of the debtor can only 
involve further delay which, given δD > 0, the debtor dislikes. As X
H
s
s
 is decreasing 
in δH, it follows that Tˆ  is increasing in δH. As both 
X
H
s
s  and 
HTe δ−  are decreasing 
in δH, T  is increasing in δH. Therefore, as δH→0, both ˆ, T T  are both increasing.
Appendix 2 Good Cases Make Bad Law:  
The Argentine Debt Swaps
As is well-known, Argentina did implement a RUFO clause – one that expired at 
the end of 2014. But there were two subsequent developments at variance with 
the simple bargaining model we propose: (a) a delayed – and relatively success-
ful – swap was effected in 2010, well before the expiry of the RUFO clause; and 
(b) despite the expiry of the clause – meaningful negotiations with the remaining 
holdouts have never really started; and at the time of writing there is no resolu-
tion yet in sight.16 How to account for these developments?
(a)  Bargaining Surplus Evolved Over Time (Allowing for Another 
Swap before RUFO Expiry)
For analytical convenience we assumed the surplus to be constant; but in practice 
the bargaining surplus can, and does, evolve over time.
In Argentina’s case, this had the effect that, as the economy recovered from 
recession, it increased greatly the value of the GDP warrants included in the 
16 It is widely expected, however, that fresh efforts to find a settlement will be made following 
the change of President in December 2015. 
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initial settlement in 2005 and accepted by the first round of exchange bondhold-
ers. As these warrants turned out to be unexpectedly generous (see Amicus brief 
by Prat-Gay, 2013) so, consistent with the RUFO clause, a second settlement could 
be reached with the majority of holdouts in the second swap of 2010, i.e. well 
before the date of expiry.
(b) Closing of Final Settlement with Remaining Holdouts
After this intra-RUFO swap in 2010, however, any further opportunities to settle 
were closed by the debtor. The Argentine government apparently believed that, 
by getting the support of more than 93% of holders, they had defeated the vulture 
funds once and for all. Consequently it was made clear to the creditors – and to 
the US judge – that there would never be any payment made to the remaining 
holdouts, no matter how long they waited.17
(c) The Pari Passu Ruling by Judge Griesa
The final development was that the US judge concerned, taking this as a direct 
challenge to the authority of his court, came up with a decision that backed the 
claim by one of the holdouts. His novel interpretation of the pari passu clauses 
included in the debt contracts meant the debtor would have to pay the holdout 
before the exchange bond holders; and that the payments would have to cover 
all costs of waiting (in the form of accrued interest and legal costs). On this basis, 
transfers to the holdouts could be far greater than the face value of their initial 
holdings – perhaps double.
As a principle for governing the conduct of debt restructuring in general, this 
judgment was immediately challenged, not only in academic circles but also by 
key policy-actors in amicus curiae briefs presented to the court – including that 
submitted by the US Treasury. The reason is, of course, that, far from checking 
the externality imposed by holdouts, the judgment looks set to increase it. If all 
the waiting costs of acting as a holdout are to be compensated and the full face 
value of the debt is guaranteed, all creditors will act like them. As Lee Buccheit is 
reported as saying: “You could almost say that being a holdout has become a true 
17 In a hearing in November 2013, “(Judge) Griesa showed Carmine Bocuzzi (representing 
 Argentina) reports including various underlined phrases of Christina Fernandez de Kirschner 
and Hernan Lorenzino saying that they would never pay the vulture funds, whatever Griesa ruled.” 
Burgueno (2013: p. 160), italics added.
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path to prosperity. It could take some time, but it’s a most promising business.” 
Burgueno (2013: p. 210).
Risk-sharing through swaps and restructuring will become impossible – at 
least for those sovereign debts issued under US law. Not only would there be no 
international bankruptcy court for sovereigns: there would be no restructuring 
through negotiation either.
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